1 ) The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara
The documentary <the Fog of War> directed by Errol Morris represents us 11 lessons from Robert S. McNamara who was the former president of World Band, the first Ford Motor president who was not named after Ford and then the Secretary of Defense of the United States from Kennedy Period to Johnson Period. McNamara didn’t think that he was qualified for the position the Secretary of Defense at the end of 1960 when he was in Ford Motor Company, but Kennedy insisted that his background as the commander of World War II and his Pragmatism which was based on logical analysis make him the best person for this critical position. McNamara at that time didn’t know how much he would pay for his decision in the future. Realist or not? Just by watching McNamara’s earlier life through the film and no matter what he said later as an old man who was emotionally talking about his past as the Secretary of Defense also as a husband who deeply loved his wife, he is a realist. During World War II, it was McNamara that recommended the air force to bomb Japanese cities by using B-29, quickly weakening Japan for just one night. He has always been in accordance with General Curtis LeMay in this point. He repeated what LeMay said after a wingman died from attacking from 5,000 feet in resolute and decisive manner, “I sent him [the wingman] there. And I've been there, I know what it is. But, you lost one wingman, and we destroyed Tokyo.” (Morris 2003) As we learn from lesson 4 which is to maximize efficiency during the war. If one want to achieve something one must sacrifice some other things. Like McNamara said that killing is sometimes saving. In China, there is a adage which is “You cannot both get fish and a bear’s paw at the same time.” That means if you want to eat fish then you cannot eat other kind of meat dish. You can only choose one you like more. That’s totally realism. According to realism, survival is one of the three main principles. McNamara had chosen to survive so he only focused on defeating Japan as soon as possible. And in Cuban Missile Crisis it was the same. During the phone calling part, when Kennedy asked what to do with Cuba, he immediately claimed that they should make a striking plan to get ready to invade Cuba. He thought that the Cuban nuclear weapon was a big treat to America, and for the security of his country he need to defense first. Even though he made a mistake, when he talked about it he seemed not felt that guilty. So we are going into the most contradictory part, and here is when McNamara began to doubt about himself. Two destroyers of the United States reported that they had been attacked. Though no one was certain about the attacker, Johnson and McNamara did believe and assume it was done by Northern Vietnam as a test of their durability, which turned out later to be a mistake. As a response, McNamara formulated the bombing program “Rolling Thunder”. Even at that time when he talked about the mistake which was the blasting fuse of Vietnam War he still didn’t think that he should be sorry for that. He said “everyone makes mistakes” with his shoulder shrugging a little bit like it was something normal. Because at that time when he decided to hit back, all in his mind was that Vietnam was attacking United States and this was a danger to his country. He only wanted to face the reality and stop this kind of invasion. All he had to do was just to fight before things getting worse. It was all originated in the same perspective just as before, so why should he be sorry for that? Until then, we still can assert that McNamara was a realist. But what makes us question about this assertion is coming. In USA the Vietnam War can also be named as the McNamara War. But in the film, when 85-year-old McNamara was talking to 45-year-old McNamara, it seems that he was the backbone force in restricting the Military. And he highly praised in the Cuban Missile Crisis how President Kennedy focused on the main force of their enemy, making an agreement with the Soviet Union head Khrushchev as Tommy Thompson suggested, thus avoiding a devastating nuclear war. And McNamara still believes that if Kennedy had not been assassinated in 1963, the government of United States would in most cases withdraw troops from Vietnam in 1965, there wouldn’t be a 10 year long cruel Vietnam War. It was like he would rather get rid of his noble position just for stopping the war. And in fact he did so. But what about the “killing for saving” before? “In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil. ” This was from the Responsibility Theory in 1946 for introspecting about the World War II brought out by philosopher Reinhold Neibuhr. He thought that World War II was an American war of justice, even though they all violated the principle of not hitting the civilian. And American people must learn to accept this kind of moral idea. “We have certain ideals, certain responsibilities. Recognize that at times you will have to engage in evil—but minimize it.” (Morris 2003) And with the lesson 5 “Proportionality should be a guideline in war” McNamara at last concluded that if there had to be a war, it should be a war of justice just as what he thought of LeMay’s actions toward war were. Justice is the relevant means of organizing social relations and their conflicting claims. The demands of justice exist paradoxically within the human heart. On the one hand, justice is imperfect. If humans pursue only justice then justice will inexorably fade out of existence and self-interest would take over. (Mark 231) Even though McNamara was looking back to history just as Neibuhr did, but all his experience pointed to the future, just to provide something the young generations to refer to, to path way for the nuclear war in the future. His educational background made him a rational analyst in data and strategy of war. His job made him a realist. Even though he admitted that the war brought too much misery for the civilians, he insisted that in a great measure it was because of the president. He said that the war was too complex for people to understand. And as for the responsibility and the guilty, he didn’t say a word. Because from the point of realism, he didn’t do anything wrong. His only fault was that he realized too late that the Vietnam War was meaningless. He resigned not because of the death number. If the Vietnam War would lead to a meaningful result, he wouldn’t resign no matter how many people would sacrifice. If Secretary of Defense McNamara had been informed by Neo-liberalism, would it have been an effective way to avoid the need for his “eleven lessons”? My answer would be “No.” Neo-liberalists believe that in order to counterbalance the fear that results from the anarchical international system, it is imperative that states peacefully coexist and create political, economic, and social ties to one another through treaties, alliances, and membership of international organizations and institutions. “I'm not so naive or simplistic to believe we can eliminate war,” McNamara told Morris, “We're not going to change human nature anytime soon.” But he was not at all realism, because he was not blind at all. He could see through what he was doing and at the same time analyzing if he was doing the right and useful thing. So as Kennedy thought that he was a pragmatist. Realism can be problematic for pragmatists where realists fear pragmatism's relativism, pragmatists fear realism's authoritarianism. This combination of realism and pragmatism basically represented the Guiding Ideology of the Kennedy Government and the Military Doctrine of the Cold War. Just as McNamara said “I was in Cold War!” In the book <the best and the brightest> written by David Halberstam which discussed the causes of the Vietnam War, The diplomatic of the United States Democratic Party Chester Bowles once wrote in his diary that “The new government is lack of a firm belief about what is right and what is wrong.” He thought that even though this kind of pragmatism which mostly relied on the logical analysis and mathematical operation did got the right answer in the shortest time, once the country went into the situation of specific international dispute, without taking the basic moral perspective into consideration, the pragmatism always cause the government to make wrong decisions which could not last long. Such as the Bay of Pig Events in Cuba. As McNamara said, one of President Kennedy’s excellences was that he could introspect the logical reasoning and withdraw troops when it was necessary. In the film we can see many times Domino were pushed down one by one on the map of Southeast Asia to indicate that the Kennedy Government determined to defeat the communist force of Vietnam then to pin down the whole East Asia by armed force in the early 60s. The Government took the independence of Vietnam for granted all for the leading position in Military force and thought spread strategy when facing the Communism during the Cold War. It wasn’t until that 58,000 American soldiers, causing an Anti-War wave that the Government started to think about withdrawing troops. I don’t think that the 30,000 Vietnam deaths were under the moral norms of the Government. When McNamara talked about the bombing in Japan when assisting the General Curtis LeMay, being asked that if they should do this to Japanese civilian, the answer was a mater-of-course. Because if they hadn’t blown the willpower of Japanese Military thoroughly, it would have been the American soldiers that dying like Japanese. In the book < The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara> by James G. Blight and Janet M. Langd, they provided a group of data which was in the 19th century , the rate of civilian death was 10%, in the World War II, it was 50% but 75% in 20th , called “McNamara’s Century”. Nevertheless, all the wars in the world, no matter it was the 911 Event or the Gulf War, they all held the flags calling for freedom, for democracy. The Fog of War that McNamara said was that the modern war is becoming more and more complicated, more and more variable, and it was almost impossible for one not to make any mistake. But I think there is something deeper inside. And that’s why I don’t think the influence of Neo-realism would eliminate the need for his <11 lessons> because his way to survival made him to be responsible and loyal for what he was doing which was to win the war for the competing interests, which was the Elitism covered by the Justice. The two most common approaches, idealism and realism, and their offspring, Neo-liberalism and Neo-realism, are illustrated by two former Harvard professors and leaders in U.S. government, Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara. For Kissinger, it’s not so much a question of universal moral principles; it is primarily a question of taking care of America’s national interests in a world compromised by human nature’s inherent pursuit of power. If human nature is the problem, how to deal with it is the issue. The history of humanity’s attempts to do so does not give much cause for hope. We must admit that no method of taming human nature has yet been found. Albert Einstein famously said that it is easier to denature plutonium than to change human nature. Just as what McNamara said at the end of the film, “There is a poem from T.S Eliot that I just love, ‘We shall not cease from exploring. And at the end of the exploration, we will return to where we started. And know the place for the first time. ’And that’s the sense where I’m beginning to be.” What did he mean by return to where we started? Human nature I think. No matter what kind of perspective we stand for. We are human beings, even animals. From the New Testament comes a relevant question: “Do you know where your fights and arguments come from?” The answer in the Apostle James’s words: “They come from the selfish desires that war within you. You want things, but you do not have them. So you are ready to kill and are jealous of other people, but you still cannot get what you want. So you argue and fight.” (James 4:1–2, New Century Version).
美国导演埃洛·莫里斯(Errol Morris)2003年的纪录片《战争迷雾》(The Fog of War)讲述了美国肯尼迪-约翰逊政府的国防部长、福特汽车公司第一位非福特家族总裁、前世界银行行长的罗伯特·麦克纳马拉(Robert McNamara)所总结的11条战争经验教训。这11条教训中,第9条“为了行善,有时必须先行恶”很令人迷惑。
尽管如此,麦克纳马拉提出“为了行善,有时必须先行恶”并非偶然,他以此来在一定程度上为二战美军的行为和后来的越战开脱并不令人意外,因为这基本代表了肯尼迪-约翰逊政府的基本指导思想和冷战时期的美国军事指导原则。在David Halberstam探讨越战起因的《出类拔萃》(The Best and the Brightest)一书中,肯尼迪内阁的副国务卿,来自康涅狄格州的民主党外交官切斯特·鲍尔斯(Chester Bowles)曾在私人日记中担忧肯尼迪精英一派的实用主义至上原则:“新政府缺乏一种有关什么是对、什么是错的坚定信念。”他认为这种一切依赖逻辑分析加减乘除的实用主义尽管在形势宽松时间充裕的正常时期大体总能确保正确答案的推出,但一旦进入国际纠纷边防突发事件的非常时期,不以基本道德观念为基准,逻辑思维战胜一切的实用主义则往往会使一个政府缺乏远见,做出牺牲长远利益错误行动,如1961年的古巴猪猡湾事件。(1961年,肯尼迪错误的估计了古巴民众对卡斯特罗共产主义政府的支持,在CIA的支持下运送了1500名古巴流亡士兵入侵古巴猪猡湾,三天后入侵便被镇压。这不仅是肯尼迪新政府的重大军事失误,更是重大的政治失误。古巴革命政府和卡斯特罗的统治因此得到了巩固。)
在James G. Blight和Janet M. Langd的《战争迷雾:罗伯特·麦克纳马拉一生的经验教训》一书的最后一章“威尔逊的鬼魂”提供了一组令人胆颤心惊的数字:在19世纪的战争中,平民死亡率是10%;二战中是50%;而二十世纪,也就是“麦克纳马拉的世纪”,平民死亡率达到了75%!然而每一场战争,不管是恐怖分子袭击纽约世贸大楼,还是小布什政府的海湾战争,所有的发言人都打着为人民、自由、正义而战的旗号,滔滔不绝义正言辞。麦克纳马拉说所谓“战争迷雾”是指现代战争越来越复杂,变量越来越多,不犯错误简直不可能;但我认为这些战争具象迷雾的背后其实还有更深一层的迷雾,一层掩盖战争背后利益争夺真相,令统治者和当权派们一直讳莫如深的迷雾,那就是摒弃道德观的实用主义,那就是“为了行善,有时必须先行恶”鹰派思潮,那就是用“人民”和“正义”来充当势力扩张挡箭牌的精英主义,那就是用民族主义和宗教信仰来为民众洗脑的极权思想。意识不到这点,战争迷雾终将挥之不去,“威尔逊的鬼魂”死不瞑目。
这种衡水人,,只在乎自己曾经出现在多少rooms where it happens,,,Satan has his special project arranged for ya in the hell sweet hell 🤗
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I wish I had watched this one before my own documentarynproject about the Korean War. But now begin to understand more and more about Dr. Frost's comment: knowing it wouldn't have prevented anything from happening
这片子居然在电信宽带有线点播里而且加了中文字幕。开篇即介绍了马克纳马纳最重要的政治观点:文人领军和军队政治独立。电信的节目编辑你对党指挥枪有意见请直说吗.......
秒杀其他所有关于战争的纪录片
这种衡水人,,只在乎自己曾经出现在多少rooms where it happens,,,Satan has his special project arranged for ya in the hell sweet hell 🤗
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I wish I had watched this one before my own documentarynproject about the Korean War. But now begin to understand more and more about Dr. Frost's comment: knowing it wouldn't have prevented anything from happening
谁的冷战,谁的内战......
国际政治专业必看。另外也是访谈式纪录片的典范
访谈类纪录片的极致,十一个章节中间有多次时间点的跳跃也完全不觉得混乱。大概内容说白了就是:“战争很复杂,很多事情我们也事先不知道啦,知道了可能就不会死这么多人啦,让对方死很多人也是为了国家啦,没犯法的打仗时候哪有法律说不行,我是听总统的话办事啦。越战责任?总统的咯!”—甩锅侠
一切都不是那么的简单如历史里头所述
战争是不道德的,超越理智层面的。因此谈论它的责任归属更超越了人类的能力。这才是逻辑...
对这个历史陈述剧里面最喜欢的一个部分其实是my middle name is Strange
从福特总裁到国防部长。把一家之言拍到极致。我惊异的是:国防部长与总统之间的电话录音入档了,并且是可以公开的档案。
不仅仅是越战
与《杀戮演绎》《沉默之像》中的行刑者们产生了巧妙的互文。PS:原来导演是此两部电影的制片...察看导演条目才发觉,个别段落有着极相似对话发生
麦克纳马拉风起云涌的个人史与他在任期间同样风起云涌的美国与世界史盘旋交织,前十课所学到的一切都是为了最后一课的总结:“你无法改变人性”。
麦克纳马拉担任过福特汽车总裁、美国两届总统的国防部长、世界银行总裁。他也是越战的主要决策与执行人。哈佛背景使他更善于从结果数据来分析原因与调整策略。他直言战争给平民的伤害,也承认自己的立场导致了大量平民的死亡。对此他辩解为战争太复杂人类能力局限,而对于战争的责任和罪恶感不致一词。
至少他是有资格上这十一堂课的.至少他是真诚的.摩尔的片在此片面前就像嗷嗷乱叫的跳梁小丑.
一句话对我印象比较深:人可以用理性解决绝大多数的问题,但是人的理性是有限的。虽然没有提出怎么解决理性有限这个问题,但是我想,还是得依靠人的道德,即在理性层面之上用道德审视行为的正确性。 片中还说,人性是无法改变的,但是我想说,战争只是少数人的决定,大多数人的人性并不像总统那样,如
越战逐步卷入的材料在《出类拔萃之辈》里基本都看过了,没太新鲜的。麦克纳马拉85岁思维还这么清晰,表达还这么流畅,倒是很令人羡慕。果然真正的精英都是在哪都闪闪发光的。
从细节描述大事件 总是更详尽也更身临其近的